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I. INTRODUCTION
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or Commis-
sion) is the agency with primary responsibility for enforcing federal
employment discrimination laws.' An individual asserting a claim under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VU),2 the Age Discrimi-
* B.B.A., J.D., University of Iowa; Shareholder, Ryley, Carlock & Applewhite,
Phoenix, Arizona; Chairman, Arizona Agricultural Employment Relations Board; Editor,
The Arizona Labor Letter.
1. See 29 U.S.C. § 626 (1994) (Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967); 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1994) (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); 42 U.S.C. §
12117(a) (1994) (Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990); Bornholdt v. Brady, 869
F.2d 57, 66 (2d Cir. 1989). Other federal agencies share this responsibility in specific
areas. For example, the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs of the Unit-
ed States Department of Labor oversees enforcement of Executive Order 11246 and
section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-30.1 to .37, 60-741.26(a)
(1995). The United States Department of Justice has certain enforcement responsibili-
ties in discrimination cases involving public sector employers. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-
5(0(1), 2000e-6, 12117(a) (1994); 29 C.F.R. § 1601.29 (1995); United States v. City &
County of Denver, 927 F. Supp. 1396, 1398-1400 & n.3 (D. Colo. 1996). State agencies
also share responsibility for enforcing federal employment discrimination laws by
virtue of certain federal statutory "deferral" provisions. See 29 U.S.C. § 633(b) (1994);
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c), (d); 29 C.F.R. §§ 1601.13, 1601.70-.80, 1626.9 (1995). Despite
being the "linchpin" of the statutory enforcement scheme, Leslie Abbott, Comment,
Out of Balance: Excluding EEOC Determinations Under Federal Rule of Evidence
403, 24 Loy. LA. L REv. 707, 716 (1991), the EEOC cannot adjudicate employment
disputes or impose sanctions. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44
(1974). Thus, "final responsibility for enforcement of [federal employment discrimina-
tion legislation] is vested in the courts." Id.
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994). Title VII is the "cornerstone" of federal
employment discrimination legislation, Abbott, supra note 1, at 711 n.33, and prohibits
such discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, and national origin. 42
nation in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA),3 or the Americans with Dis-
abilities Act of 1990 (ADA) 4 must file a charge of discrimination with
the Commission before commencing litigation.5 Individuals with claims
under the Equal Pay Act of 1963 also may seek the Commission's as-
sistance before bringing suit,' although filing a charge of discrimination
with the EEOC is not a prerequisite to Equal Pay Act litigation.8
Upon receipt of a charge alleging a violation of one of these acts,9
the Commission commences an investigation.o As part of its investiga-
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). Congress' primary objective in enacting Title VII was to equalize
employment opportunities and remove barriers that have operated to favor white
individuals over other individuals. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30
(1971).
3. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994). The ADEA is the first federal statute intended to
prevent employment discrimination based on age. Platt v. Burroughs Corp., 424 F.
Supp. 1329, 1340 (E.D. Pa. 1976). Its stated goal is "to promote employment of older
persons based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination
in employment; [and] to help employers and workers find ways of meeting problems
arising from the impact of age on employment." 29 U.S.C. § 621(b).
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994). The ADA constitutes a "comprehensive nation-
al mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities."
Id. § 12101(b)(1). The act reflects a "virtual revolution in the area of rights for the
disabled . . . ." Trautz v. Weisman, 819 F. Supp. 282, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
5. United Air Lines v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 554-55 & n.4 (1977) (Title VII); Vinson
v. Ford Motor Co., 806 F.2d 686, 688 (6th Cir. 1986) (ADEA); Bridges v. Diesel Serv.,
No. CIV.A. 94-2101, 1994 WL 369508, at *1 (E.D. Pa. July 13, 1994) (ADA).
6. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1994). The Equal Pay Act prohibits employers from com-
pensating employees at a rate less than it pays to similarly situated employees of the
opposite sex. Id. Its purpose is to eliminate all sex-based wage discrimination that
Congress found to exist on a broad scale at the time of its enactment. Grumbine v.
United States, 586 F. Supp. 1144, 1146 (D.D.C. 1984).
7. See Assily v. Tampa Gen. Hosp., 814 F. Supp. 1069, 1070 (M.D. Fla. 1993). The
EEOC has had enforcement authority in Equal Pay Act cases since 1979. See McKee
v. McDonnell Douglas Technical Servs. Co., 700 F.2d 260, 263 n.4 (5th Cir. 1983).
8. See County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 175 n.14 (1981); Miranda v.
B & B Cash Grocery Store, 975 F.2d 1518, 1527 (11th Cir. 1992); Ososky v. Wick, 704
F.2d 1264, 1265-66 (D.C. Cir. 1983). But cf. Assily, 814 F. Supp. at 1071-72 (holding
that an Equal Pay Act plaintiff "must have both exhausted his administrative remedies
and complied with the EEOC's charging procedures" before filing suit).
9. Strictly speaking, the procedures described here apply only in Title VII and
ADA cases. No EEOC charge-filing procedures expressly apply to Equal Pay Act cas-
es, although the Commission does have investigatory authority in such cases. See 29
C.F.R. § 1620.30(a)(1) (1995). Slightly different rules govern ADEA cases. Upon re-
ceipt of a charge alleging a violation of the ADEA, for example, the Commission's
specific obligation is not to investigate, but to attempt "conciliation." 29 U.S.C.
§ 626(b) (1994); 29 C.F.R. § 1626.12 (1995). However, investigation of the charge is
an essential component of the Commission's duty to conciliate. See Marshall v. Sun
Oil Co., 605 F.2d 1331, 1334-35 (5th Cir. 1979) (observing that "conciliation would not,
be meaningful" unless the EEOC undertook "some independent investigation or veri-
fication of evidence supplied by others").
10. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(b), -8(a) (1994); 29 C.F.R. § 1601.15(a) (1995); EEOC v.
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tion, the Commission is authorized to engage in various forms of evi-
dence gathering," which may or may not culminate in a formal fact-
finding conference. 2 If, upon completion of its investigation, the Com-
mission concludes that discrimination has occurred, 3 it issues a "rea-
sonable cause" determination. 4 Once that determination is made, 5
Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 63 (1984). See generally Abbott, supra note 1, at 711-12
("The EEOC is given broad authority . . . to investigate charges of employment dis-
crimination."). Under certain circumstances, the Commission can dismiss a charge
without conducting an investigation. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1601.18 (1995). But rf.
Smith v. Universal Servs., Inc., 454 F.2d 154, 156 (5th Cir. 1972) (stating that the
EEOC is "obligateld] . . . to investigate complaints of unlawful discrimination to de-
termine whether probable cause exists to believe that the employer has engaged in
discriminatory practices"); Abbott, supra note 1, at 707 n.2 (observing that "Title VII
directs the EEOC to investigate a charge of employment discrimination").
11. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(a) (1994); 29 C.F.R. §§ 1601.15-17 (1995); see also EEOC v.
Michael Constr. Co., 706 F.2d 244, 248 (8th Cir. 1983) ("Title VII ... grants the
EEOC access to evidence of unlawful employment practices . . . ."); EEOC v. Chica-
go Miniature Lamp Works, 526 F. Supp. 974, 975 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (stating that the
EEOC "is permitted to gather any evidence it deems appropriate"); Abbott, supra
note 1, at 726 (observing that "the EEOC [is allowed] access to 'virtually any materi-
al that might cast light on the allegations against the employer'") (quoting Shell Oil
Co., 466 U.S. at 68-69).
12. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.15(c) (1995); see also Chicago Miniature Lamp Works, 526 F.
Supp. at 975 ("EEOC is not required to create a record or hold any sort of hear-
ing."). See generally EEOC v. Keco Indus., 748 F.2d 1097, 1100 (6th Cir. 1984) ("[Tlhe
nature and extent of an EEOC investigation into a discrimination claim is a matter
within the discretion of that agency.").
13. The precise inquiry is whether it is "more likely than not" the individual who
filed the charge has been the victim of unlawful discrimination. EEOC Compl. Man.
(CCH) § 40.2 at 1062 (1993). "This is known as the 'litigation-worthy' standard."
Abbott, supra note 1, at 729; see EEOC v. Bay Shipbuilding Corp., 27 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1372, 1374-75 (E.D. Wis. 1981) (stating the EEOC determination is
whether its reasonable cause findings are litigation worthy); BARBARA SCHLE1 & PAUL
GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAw 374 (referring to the "new [EEOC] state-
ment of enforcement policy further refining its 'litigation-worthy' standard for 'reason-
able cause' determinations"); Janis G. White, Note, The Use of EEOC Investigative
Files in Title VII Actions, 61 B.U. L REV. 1245, 1247 n.13, 1264 (1981) (discussing
reasonable cause determinations).
14. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.21 (1995). In ADEA cases, the Commission issues a "letter of
violation" when it has "a reasonable basis to conclude that a violation of the Act has
occurred." Id. § 1626.15(b). As will be discussed, the distinction between EEOC rea-
sonable cause determinations and EEOC letters of violation, while subtle, bears on
the issues addressed in this article. See EEOC v. Manville Sales Corp., 27 F.3d 1089,
1095 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1252 (1995); Gilchrist v. Jim Slemons Im-
ports, Inc., 803 F.2d 1488, 1500 (9th Cir. 1988); Cary v. Carmichael, 908 F. Supp.
1334, 1341-42 (E.D. Va. 1995).
15. If the Commission does not conclude that discrimination has occurred, the
the Commission attempts to resolve the charge through conciliation.'6
If conciliation is unsuccessful, the Commission issues a notice of right
to sue to,'7 or brings suit on behalf of, the party who submitted the
charge.
8
Congress has not addressed the issue of whether EEOC reasonable
cause determinations are admissible in subsequent employment discrim-
ination litigation.' Consequently, the courts are split on (1) the extent
to which such determinations are admissible,0 and (2) where they are
applicable regulations provide for issuance of a "no cause" or "no reasonable cause"
determination, which constitutes notice to the individual who filed the charge of the
right to bring suit on the matters alleged therein. See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.19 (1995). On
April 19, 1995, however, the Commission voted to eliminate "no cause" determinations
in favor of dismissals without particularized findings in cases where the Commission's
investigation does not establish reasonable cause to believe discrimination has oc-
curred. Memorandum from Frances M. Hart, Executive Officer and Executive Secre-
tariat, EEOC, to Gilbert F. Casellas, et al., EEOC Commissioners 3 (Apr. 19, 1995)
(on file with the Pepperdine Law Review). That change is consistent with the lan-
guage of Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1994) ("If the Commission determines
after . . . investigation that there is not reasonable cause to believe that the charge
is true, it shall dismiss the charge .. . ."); Michael Constr. Co., 706 F.2d at 252
("[Tihe EEOC must dismiss a charge if it finds no reasonable cause after its investi-
gation of the charge."). Given the change, this article focuses on the impact of rea-
sonable cause determinations.
16. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1994); 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1994); 29 C.F.R. §§
1601.24(a), 1626.15(b) (1995); Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. at 63-64; Isaac v. Harvard Univ.,
769 F.2d 817, 819 n.2 (1st Cir. 1985); Keco Indus., 748 F.2d at 1101. Conciliation has
been described as "an integral part of the statutory scheme to enforce ... prohibi-
tions against employment discrimination." EEOC v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co.,
375 F. Supp. 237, 242 (N.D. Ala. 1974). Indeed, because the basic philosophy underly-
ing the federal discrimination laws is that "voluntary compliance is preferable to
court action," Dent v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 406 F.2d 399, 402 (5th Cir.
1969), the EEOC's conciliation obligation is "among its most essential functions."
EEOC v. Raymond Metal Prods. Co., 530 F.2d 590, 596.(4th Cir. 1976).
17. Receipt of a notice of right, to sue is a condition precedent to an individual
action under Title VII or the ADA. Sherman v. Standard Rate Data Serv., 709 F.
Supp. 1433, 1436 n.4 (N.D. M. 1989); Hladid v. Jeffrey's Consol., Ltd., 652 F. Supp.
388, 392 (E.D.N.Y. 1987). No similar requirement exists under the Equal Pay Act or
the ADEA_ See Miranda v. B & B Cash Grocery Store, 975 F.2d 1518, 1526-27 (11th
Cir. 1992); Weaver v. Ault Corp., 859 F. Supp. 256, 257-59 (N.D. Tex. 1993).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 20OOe-5(f)(1) (1994); 29 C.F.R. §§ 1601.28(b), 1626.15(d) (1995);
Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 359-60 (1977); Isaac, 769 F.2d at 819
n.2. In some cases, the charge may have been submitted by a member of the Com-
mission itself. See 42 U.S.C. § 200Oe-5(b) (1994). In that event, notice of right to sue
is given to, or suit is brought on behalf of, the person whom the charge alleges was
aggrieved by an unlawful employment practice. Id. § 2000e-5(f)(1); 29 C.F.R.
§ 1601.28(b)(1)(ii), (3)(ii).
19. See Smith v. Universal Servs. Inc., 454 F.2d 154,. 156 (5th Cir. 1972); Abbott,
supra note 1, at 730; White, supra note 13, at 1245.
20. See Barfield v. Orange County, 911 F.2d 644, 649-50 (11th Cir. 1990); Johnson
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admissible,1 whether they are sufficient to permit a plaintiff to survive
an employer's motion for summary judgment. The Ninth Circuit con-
siders reasonable cause determinations to be so probative of dis-
crimination that they (1) can never be excluded from evidence, 3 and
(2) categorically preclude summary judgment in favor of the employ-
er. Other jurisdictions leave the admissibility of reasonable cause de-
terminations to the discretion of the trial court,2 and hold that such
determinations standing alone are insufficient to preclude summary
judgment.26
v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 734 F.2d 1304, 1309 (8th Cir. 1984); Abrams v. Lightolier,
Inc., 702 F. Supp. 509, 512 (D.N.J. 1988); Abbott, supra note 1, at 742.
21. If an EEOC determination is not admissible, it cannot provide the basis for
avoiding summary judgment. See Kesselring v. United Techs. Corp., 753 F. Supp. 1359,
1369 (S.D. Ohio 1991) (holding that a reasonable cause determination was "not suf-
ficient to save plaintiffs ADEA claim . . . from summary judgment" because the de-
termination would not be admissible in a jury trial); Stewart v. Personnel Pool of
Am., Inc., No. Civ.A. 92-2581, 1993 WL 525575, at *6 (D.N.J. Dec. 16, 1993) ("Exercis-
ing its discretion here, the Court concludes that [the] EEOC determination would not
be admissible at trial and, therefore, cannot be considered on [the employer's] sum-
mary judgment motion."), affd, 30 F.3d 1488 (3d Cir. 1994). See generally Paldzegi v.
First Nat'l Bank of Boston, 831 F. Supp. 901, 909 (D. Mass. 1993) ("A plaintiff oppos-
ing summary judgment cannot rely on . . . inadmissible evidence to satisfy its burden
of proving discrimination."), affd, 56 F.3d 59 (1st Cir. 1995).
22. Compare Gifford v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 685 F.2d 1149, 1156 (9th
Cir. 1982) (reasonable cause determination is sufficient to avoid summary judgment)
with Goldberg v. B. Green & Co., 836 F.2d 845, 848 (4th Cir. 1988) (reasonable cause
determination is not sufficient).
23. See Batfield, 911 F.2d at 650 (noting that "the Ninth Circuit seems to [say]
that there can exist no EEOC determinations in which the ... circumstances...
justify exclusion from evidence") (internal quotation marks omitted); Abbott, supra
note 1, at 743 ("The Ninth Circuit, taldng an ... extreme position, [has] implied that
under no circumstance may a judge have discretion to exclude an EEOC determina-
tion.") (citing Plummer v. Western Int'l Hotels Co., 656 F.2d 502, 505 (9th Cir. 1981)).
24. See Mitchell v. Office of Los Angeles County, 805 F.2d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 1986);
Proctor v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 795 F.2d 1472, 1477 (9th Cir. 1986);
Gifford, 685 F.2d at 1156.
25. This is the clear majority view of the federal courts. See Crockett v. City of
Billings, 761 P.2d 813, 820 (Mont. 1988).
26. See, e.g., Goldberg, 836 F.2d at 848; Cary v. Carmichael, 908 F. Supp. 1334,
134142 (E.D. Va 1995); Bailey v. South Carolina Dep't of Soc. Servs., 851 F. Supp.
219, 221 (D.S.C. 1993); Kesselring, 753 F. Supp. at 1368-69; Baumgardner v. Inco Al-
loys Int'l, 746 F. Supp. 623, 625 (S.D. W. Va. 1990).
Because trial court judges sitting as triers of fact 27 are free to give
reasonable cause determinations whatever weight they deem appropri-
ate,28 the conflict over the admissibility of such determinations origi-
nally may have been somewhat academic.29 That has not been the
case, however, since the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 199 1,3°
which made jury trials available in Title VII and ADA cases." The ad-
missibility issue is significant in cases tried to juries32 because a rea-
sonable cause determination is more likely to create unfair prejudice in
the minds of jurors than in the mind of a trial judge.' In addition, the
issue of whether a reasonable cause determination precludes summary
27. Prior to 1991, there was no right to a jury trial in Title VII and ADA cases.
See Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 164 (1981); Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n
v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 375 (1979); Oswald v. Laroche Chems., 162 F.R.D. 283, 284-
85 (E.D. La. 1995). There was also doubt about the right to a jury trial in ADEA
cases until 1978, when the Supreme Court decided Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575
(1978). See EEOC v. Corry Jamestown Corp., 719 F.2d 1219, 1221 (3d Cir. 1983) ("As
originally enacted, the ADEA did not contain any references regarding the availability
of jury trials in actions instituted either by private individuals or brought by the gov-
ernment."); Hannon v. Continental Nat'l Bank, 427 F. Supp. 215, 218 (D. Colo. 1977)
("Courts have divided on the issue of the availability of a jury trial under the pro-
visions of the ADEA.").
28. See, e.g., Harris v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 537 F. Supp. 716, 721-22 (N.D.
Ala. 1982) (giving no weight to reasonable cause determination), affd in part and
rev'd in part, 712 F.2d 1377 (11th Cir. 1983).
29. See Tulloss v. Near N. Montessori Sch., Inc., 776 F.2d 150, 153 (7th Cir. 1985).
If that is so, however, there has been a surprising amount of litigation over the is-
sue. See Crockett, 761 P.2d at 820 (observing that "much federal case law exists on
the subject of the admissibility under federal law of findings by the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission").
30. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991). For the author's consideration of
the 1991 Act, see Michael D. Moberly & Linda H. Miles, The Impact of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 on Individual Title VII Liability, 18 OKI. CrrY U. L. 'REv. 475
(1993).
31. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c) (1994); Landgraf v. U.S.I. Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244
(1994); Harrelson v. Elmore County, 859 F. Supp. 1465, 1468 (M.D. Ala. 1994). See
generally Abbott, supra note 1, at 714 n.53 ("If the right to a jury trial is extended
to Title VII plaintiffs, the controversy over whether judges have discretion . . . to
exclude EEOC determinations from juries becomes all the more important to re-
solve.").
32. See Johnson v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 734 F.2d 1304, 1309 (8th Cir. 1984).
One commentator has observed that "EEOC findings on reasonable cause were initial-
ly considered per se admissible only in Title VII bench trials." Abbott, supra note 1,
at 742.
33. See Barfield v. Orange County, 911 F.2d 644, 651 (11th Cir. 1990); see also
Abbott, supra note 1, at 712 n.45 (finding the potential prejudice of admitting reason-
able cause determinations "more pertinent in jury trials because jurors are less aware
than judges of the 'limits and vagaries of administrative determinations'") (quoting
Barfield, 911 F.2d at 651).
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judgment in favor of the employer has significant practical implications
for employment discrimination litigants.'
This article explores these issues, 5 with particular focus on the
Ninth Circuit's approach,' which is more favorable to plaintiffs than
the view prevailing elsewhere.s7 Part II of the article discusses the ad-
missibility of EEOC reasonable cause determinations in both the Ninth
Circuit and other jurisdictions.' Part III considers the impact of rea-
sonable cause determinations on summary judgment proceedings, again
contrasting the view in the Ninth Circuit with those prevailing else-
where. 9 Part IV addresses the more important policy considerations
underlying these issues." The article ultimately concludes that trial
courts should have discretion to exclude reasonable cause determina-
34. Summary judgment has been hailed as an efficient means of disposing of
meritless employment discrimination claims. See, e.g., Blue v. United States Dep't of
the Army, 914 F.2d 525, 535 (4th Cir. 1990); Palucki v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 879
F.2d 1568, 1572-73 (7th Cir. 1989). If the existence of an EEOC reasonable cause
determination is sufficient to preclude summary judgment, use of that procedural tool
is foreclosed in some employment discrimination cases in which summary judgment
might have been appropriate. See, e.g., Cary v. Carmichael, 908 F. Supp. 1334, 1341-42
(E.D. Va. 1995). In addition, a plaintiff who is the beneficiary of a reasonable cause
determination may elect to engage in little or no pretrial discovery, cf. Bailey v.
South Carolina Dep't of Soc. Servs., 851 F. Supp. 219, 220 n.2 (D.S.C. 1993), confident
that, at least in the Ninth Circuit, the determination will be admitted into evidence,
and hopeful that the jury will be "particularly influenced by the value of an official
government report, and give it undue weight." Abbott, supra note 1, at 738.
35. For commentary on the admissibility issue predating the enactment of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, see Abbott, supra note 1 (advocating rejection of a rule of per
se admissibility) and White, supra note 13 (arguing for a rule of presumptive admissi-
bility). There appears to have been no previous academic consideration of the sum-
mary judgment issue.
36. The focus is prompted by the uniqueness of the Ninth Circuit's view, see
Barfield, 911 F.2d at 649-50; Tulloss v. Near N. Montessori Sch., Inc., 776 F.2d 150,
153 (7th Cir. 1985), as well as the fact that it is the view with which the auth6r is
most familiar.
37. The Ninth Circuit's view apparently is based, at least in part, on its belief that
"[a] civil rights plaintiff has a difficult burden of proof, and should not be deprived
of what might be persuasive evidence." Plummer v. Western Int'l Hotels Co., 656 F.2d
502, 505 (9th Cir. 1981) (footnotes omitted). However, that belief is open to debate.
See, e.g., La Montagne v. American Convenience Prods., 750 F.2d 1405, 1410 (7th Cir.
1984) ("The indirect method [of proof] compensates [the plaintiff] for these evidentia-
ry difficulties by permitting the plaintiff to prove his case by eliminating all lawful
motivations, instead of proving directly an unlawful motivation.").
38. See infra notes 43-110 and accompanying text.
39. See infra notes 111-94 and accompanying text.
40. See infra notes 195-239 and accompanying text.
tions where they appear untrustworthy or where their probative value
is substantially outweighed by the risk of prejudice to the employer.4
In addition, the mere existence of a reasonable cause determination
should not enable an employment discrimination plaintiff to avoid sum-
mary judgment.42
II. THE ADMISSIBILITY OF REASONABLE CAUSE DETERMINATIONS
A. The Ninth Circuit View
The Ninth Circuit first addressed the admissibility of EEOC reason-
able cause determinations in Bradshaw v. Zoological Society of San
Diego.43 The plaintiff in Bradshaw brought suit under Title VII claim-
ing the defendant refused to hire her because of her sex.' She includ-
ed as an exhibit to her complaint the EEOC reasonable cause determi-
nation, but the trial court ordered it stricken.4" The Ninth Circuit held
that the determination was admissible as evidence and accordingly
should not have been stricken from the complaint.46 Although the
weight to be given to the determination was a matter committed to the
trial court's discretion, the decision not to consider it at all was erroneous."
41. See infra notes 240-47 and accompanying text.
42. See infra notes 245-47 and accompanying text
43. 569 F.2d 1066 (9th Cir. 1978).
44. Id. at 1067.
45. Id. at 1068-69; cf. MacMillan Women's Group v. MacMillan Publ'g Co., 18 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1821, 1822 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (striking EEOC reasonable cause
determination attached as exhibit to complaint); Hart v. Buckeye Indus., 46 F.R.D. 61,
62-63 (S.D. Ga. 1968) (striking reference to reasonable cause determination from com-
plaint).
46. Bradshaw, 569 F.2d at 1069; cf. McCluney v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 489 F.
Supp. 24, 27 (E.D. Wis. 1980) ("find[ing] no justification for striking references to [a
probable cause] determination from the complaint"). An interesting variation on this
theme arose in Hambacher v. IBM, No. C95-20040 RMW (PVT), 1995 WL 150136, at
*1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 1995), where the court in an ADA case denied the plaintiffs
request for court-appointed counsel under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1)(B), in part be-
cause it was unable to evaluate the EEOC no cause determination in light of the
plaintiffs "fail[ure] to include the findings of the Commission in his pleadings." Id.
47. Bradshaw, 569 F.2d at 1069. The fact that trial courts faced with a rule of per
se admissibility (as the Ninth Circuit's approach has come to be called, see Abbott,
supra note 1, at 742) can give reasonable cause determinations as little weight as
they deem appropriate has prompted one federal appellate court to conclude that, in
bench trials, there is little functional difference between the per se rule and a rule
that gives courts discretion to exclude such determinations from evidence. Tulloss v.
Near N. Montessori Sch., Inc., 776 F.2d 150, 153 (7th Cir. 1985). That conclusion
seems to have been borne out in Harris v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 537 F. Supp.
716, 721-22 (N.D. Ala 1982), affd in part and rev'd in part, 712 F.2d 1377 (lth Cir.
1983), where the court admitted a reasonable cause determination, but refused to
give it any weight.
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In Plummer v. Western International Hotels Co.,' the Ninth Circuit
extended Bradshaw to cases involving jury trials, 4 holding that "a
plaintiff has a right to introduce an EEOC probable cause determination
in a Title VII lawsuit, regardless of... whether the case is tried before
a judge or jury."' The plaintiff in Plummer brought suit under Title VII
and 42 U.S.C. § 1981,"' alleging that she was denied a promotion be-
cause of her race. 2 Citing Bradshaw, the plaintiff sought admission of
the EEOC's reasonable cause determination.' The employer argued
that Bradshaw should not apply in cases tried to juries because a jury
might give an EEOC determination undue weight.' The trial court ap-
48. 656 F.2d 502 (9th Cir. 1981).
49. Id, at 505; see Baldwin v. Rice, 144 F.R.D. 102, 104 (E.D. Cal. 1992) ("Although
(Bradshaw] was decided prior to any jury trial right, the Ninth Circuit [in Plum-
mer] ... held that [Bradshaw] applies in Title VII actions, regardless of whether the
trial is one before the court or the jury."); Abbott, supra note 1, at 743 (citing Plum-
mer for the proposition that "[t]he Ninth Circuit was the first to conclude that an
EEOC determination may not be excluded from a jury on balancing test grounds").
Because Bradshaw involved an appeal from a summary judgment ruling, the impact
of EEOC determinations in jury trials was not considered in that case, although it
was peripherally at issue there. See infra note 61.
50. Plummer, 656 F.2d at 505. See generally Abbott, supra note 1, at 745 (charac-
terizing Plummer as "an unprecedented expansion of the per se admissibility rule"
adopted in Bradshaw).
51. Section 1981 states, in relevant part-
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same
right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be
parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and pro-
ceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citi-
zens ....
42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (1994). In Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454
(1975), the Supreme Court held that "§ 1981 affords a federal remedy against discrim-
ination in private employment on the basis of race," and that "the remedies available
under Title VII and under § 1981, although related, and although directed to most of
the same ends, are separate, distinct, and independent" Id. at 459-61.
52. Plummer, 656 F.2d at 502-03. At the time, jury trials were available under
§ 1981, but not in Title VII cases. See id. at 504 & n.6. Because jury trials were not
available under Title VII, the admissibility issue typically arose "when Title VII [was]
pled together with another statute affording the right to a jury trial." Abbott, supra
note 1, at 714. However, as a result of Congress' enactment of the Civil Rights Act
of 1991, Pub. L No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991), jury trials are now available in
many Title VII cases, and the admissibility issue can be expected to arise much more
frequently. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text
53. Plummer, 656 F.2d at 503-04.
54. Id. at 504.
parently agreed,' and excluded the determination.' The case pro-
ceeded to trial, and the jury returned a verdict for the employer.57
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit rejected the contention that excluding
the determination was a proper exercise of the trial court's discretion,
adhering instead to the "per se rule of admissibility" announced in
Bradshaw.' The court acknowledged that the admissibility of evi-
dence occasionally may vary between jury and nonjury trials.59 How-
ever, because EEOC determinations are highly probative, the court
found "no more reason to keep [them] from a jury's consideration than
from a judge's."' The court stated:
An EEOC determination, prepared by professional investigators on behalf of an
impartial agency, [is] a highly probative evaluation of an individual's discrimina-
tion complaint. If we were to adopt the distinction between jury and non-jury
trials urged by [the employer], in many cases Bradshaw could in effect be ignored
and the value of EEOC determinations wasted.... We believe that Bradshaw
should apply... even when the plaintiff requests a jury trial."
The Ninth Circuit's only departure from Bradshaw's per se rule oc-
curred in Gilchrist v. Jim Slemons Imports, Inc.62 The plaintiff in Gil-
55. The trial court did not explain the basis for its ruling. Id. at 503 n.3; see also
Abbott, supra note 1, at 743-44 (noting that the trial court in Plummer excluded the
reasonable cause determination "without specifying a reason"),
56. Plummer, 656 F.2d at 503.
57. Id. at 502-04.
58. See id. at 504 n.5, 505; cf. Johnson v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 734 F.2d 1304,
1309 (8th Cir. 1984) (referring to the "Bradshaw rule of per se admissibility"). One
commentator has stated that the Ninth Circuit does not characterize its approach as
a per se rule, Abbott supra note 1, at 709 n.20, despite discussing Plummer at
length, in which that characterization is used. See id. at 743-45. Under a per se rule
of admissibility, the evidence at issue is admissible regardless of the factual context
of the particular case. Id. at 709 n.20. "[A] per se rule . . . does not grant the trial
judge discretion to exclude the evidence if ... its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of 'unfair prejudice under the circumstances of the case."
David P. Leonard, The Use of Character to Prove Conduct: Rationality and Catharsis
in the Law of Evidence, 58 U. CoLO. L REV. 1, 14 n.71 (1986).
59. Plummer, 656 F.2d at 505. For an elaboration of the Ninth Circuit's view on
this point, see EEOC v. Farmer Bros. Co., 31 F.3d 891 (9th Cir. 1994). "[fln a bench
trial, the risk that a verdict [sic) will be affected unfairly and substantially by the
admission of . .. evidence is far less than in a jury trial." Id. at 898; see also United
States v. Caudle, 48 F.3d 433, 435 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating that "it would be most
surprising if [the] potential prejudice [from the admission of evidence] had any signif-
icance in a bench trial").
60. Plummer, 656 F.2d at 505.
61. Id. (citations omitted). In reaching that result, the court noted that Bradshaw
had not foreclosed the possibility of admitting EEOC reasonable cause determinations
in cases tried to juries, and that because the plaintiff in Bradshaw had invoked 42
U.S.C. § 1983 as well as Title VII, that case could have been tried to a jury on re-
mand. Id.
62., 803 F.2d 1488 (9th Cir. 1986).
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christ brought suit under the ADEA after his employment was
terminated.' The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff,'4 and the em-
ployer appealed.' Among other contentions, the employer argued that
the trial court erred in admitting a letter issued by the EEOC that
charged the employer with violating the ADEA.'
The Ninth Circuit drew a distinction between Title VII reasonable
cause determinations and ADEA "letters of violation." 7 That distinction
becomes critical, the court observed, "when considering the potential for
prejudicing a jury."' In the Ninth Circuit's view, reasonable cause deter-
minations do not suggest that the employer has violated Title VII, but
only that "preliminarily," there is reason to believe a statutory violation
has occurred.' A letter of violation, by contrast, reflects the EEOC's
determination that an ADEA violation has occurred."0 Its admission,
therefore, has a greater potential for prejudicing a jury.7 The court con-
cluded:
A jury may find it difficult to evaluate independently evidence of age discrimina-
tion after being informed that the EEOC has already examined the evidence and
63. Id. at 1491-92. In Gilchrist, the plaintiff alleged that his termination resulted
from age-based discrimination by the defendant employer. Id.
64. Jury trials have been available in ADEA cases since 1978, when the Supreme
Court decided Lorilard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575 (1978). Congress codified the right to
jury trials in ADEA cases later that year. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(2) (1988); Goodman
v. Heublein, Inc., 645 F.2d 127, 129-30 n.2 (2d Cir. 1981) (discussing Lorillard and the
Senate amendment to the ADEA).
65. Gilchrist, 803 F.2d at 1491.
66. Id. at 1491, 1499. The trial court had been "reluctant to admit the letter ...
but felt compelled to do so based on [its] reading of Plummer." Id. at 1500.
67. Id. The Fifth Circuit also recognizes this distinction, as has at least one federal
district court. See EEOC v. Manville Sales Corp., 27 F.3d 1089, 1095 (5th Cir. 1994);
Cary v. Carmichael, 908 F. Supp. 1334, 1341-42 (E.D. Va 1995).
68. Gilchrist, 803 F.2d at 1500; see also Abbott, supra note 1, at 744 n.317 (dis-
cussing Gilchrist and observing that "this distinction between 'preliminary' and
'conclusive' EEOC findings might affect the tendency of the evidence to unduly preju-
dice the jury").
69. Gilchrist, 803 F.2d at 1500; see also Manville Sales Corp., 27 F.3d at 1095
(stating that "a [determination] of reasonable cause is . . . tentative in its conclu-
sions"); Cary, 908 F. Supp. at 1342 (concluding that a reasonable cause determination
is "a tentative determination, and not a [finding] that the Company in fact violated
Title VII").
70. Gilchrist, 803 F.2d at 1500. The pertinent regulation provides for the issuance
of a letter of violation "[wihenever the Commission has a reasonable basis to con-
clude that a violation of the [ADEA] has occurred or will occur." 29 C.F.R.
§ 1626.15(b) (1995).
71. Gilchrist, 803 F.2d at 1500.
47
found a violation. The probative value of a letter of violation may not, in every
case, outweigh the potential for prejudice. Therefore, the per se rule of Plummer
does not apply and the district judge should have exercised his discretion to ad-
mit or to exclude the letter of violation."'
In Heyne v. Caruso,73 the Ninth Circuit dispelled any suggestion that
Gilchrist reflected a general retreat from Bradshaw and Plummer.74
The plaintiff in Heyne brought a Title VII claim alleging that she had
been terminated unlawfully for rejecting the defendant's sexual advanc-
es."5 The plaintiff sought to introduce a probable cause finding76 issued
by the Nevada Equal Rights Commission (NERC).77 The trial court re-
fused to admit the finding and prohibited the plaintiffs attorney from
72. Id. But cf. Abrams v. Lightolier, Inc., 702 F. Supp. 509, 512 (D.N.J. 1988) (fol-
lowing Plummer in ADEA case); Strickland v. American Can Co., 575 F. Supp. 1111,
1112 (N.D. Ga 1983) (same). The Gilchrist court ultimately concluded that the trial
court's admission of the letter under the per se rule of Bradshaw and Plummer was
harmless error because the potential prejudice to the employer had been mitigated by
a limiting instruction. Gilchrist, 803 F.2d at 1500-01; cf Abrams, 702 F. Supp. at 512
("[Gliven the lingering potential for prejudice, the Court will . . . entertain a jury
instruction to ensure that the jury does not deem the EEOC determination disposi-
tive. The Court has complete confidence that the jury, guided by such a charge, will
not give the EEOC letter undue weight.") (citation omitted).
73. 69 F.3d 1475 (9th Cir. 1995).
74. District courts in the Ninth Circuit have followed Brads aw and Plummer on
numerous occasions. See Baldwin v. Rice, 144 F.R.D. 102, 104 (E.D. Cal. 1992); EEOC
v. Judson Steel Co., 33 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1286, 1294 (N.D. Cal. 1982);
EEOC v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 30 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 33,232 at 27,875 (E.D. Cal.
1982); Iverson v. City of Portland Civil Serv. Bd., 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
114, 115 n.3 (D. Or. 1978).
75. Heyne, 69 F.3d at 1477. See.generally Chamberlin v. 101 Realty, Inc., 915 F.2d
777, 783 (1st Cir. 1990) (stating that "a supervisor's demand that an employee submit
to an unwelcome sexual advance or face discharge from employment could well con-
stitute a sustainable quid pro quo [sexual] harassment claim").
76. Heyne, 69 F.3d at 1477. In the employment discrimination context, the terms
.reasonable cause" and "probable cause" are often used interchangeably. See, e.g.,
Mitchell v. Office of Los Angeles County, 805 F.2d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 1986) (referring
to EEOC finding that "there is reasonable cause to believe the [charging party's] al-
legation . . . is true" as a "'probable cause' determination").
77. Heyne, 69 F.3d at 1477-78. The NERC is the agency with primary responsibility
for enforcing Nevada's employment discrimination laws. See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 613.405 (Michie 1995); Palmer v. Nevada, 787 P.2d 803, 804 (Nev. 1990).
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referring to it in opening statement.7 ' The jury returned a verdict in fa-
vor of the defendant, and the plaintiff appealed.79
On appeal, the plaintiff contended the trial court erred in refusing to
admit the probable cause finding.s' The defendant responded that, under
Gilchrist, exclusion of the finding had been a proper exercise of the trial
court's discretion.8 The Ninth Circuit rejected the defendant's argu-
ment, holding that Plummer, and not Gilchrist, was controlling.' The
court stated that the NERC determination was "a preliminary investiga-
tive determination more like the EEOC reasonable cause determination
in Plummer" than the ADEA letter of violation at issue in Gilchrist.'
In reaching this conclusion, the Heyne court emphasized that "the
Plummer ruling is not restricted solely to EEOC findings of probable
cause but extends to similar administrative determinations, including
NERC findings."' Because the Ninth Circuit believed the probative val-
ue of such findings outweighed any prejudicial effect they may have on a
jury,' the trial court committed reversible error by excluding the
NERC's determination.'
78. Heyne, 69 F.3d at 1478. After this ruling, the parties stipulated to a jury in-
struction referring to the probable cause finding, but also indicating that the plaintiff
had withdrawn her charge of discrimination before the NERC could hold a hearing
on the finding. Id. The Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs joinder in this stipulation
did not constitute a waiver of her objection to the exclusion of the NERC's finding,
because she "was given no choice but to stipulate to the jury instruction in order to
get the probable cause determination in front of the jury at all." Id. at 1484.
79. Id. at 1478.
80. Id. at 1482.
81. Id. at 1483.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See Gilchrist v. Jim Slemons Imports, Inc., 803 F.2d 1488, 1500 (9th Cir. 1986);
see also Abbott, supra note 1, at 742 ("The . . . Ninth Circuit[] take[s] the view that
EEOC determinations are so probative that their relevance to the charge of em-
ployment discrimination can never be outweighed by the concerns of unfair prejudice,
confusing or misleading a jury or undue trial delay.").
86. Heyne, 69 F.3d at 1483. The court also held that the stipulated jury instruction
did not satisfy the requirements of Plummer. The court stated: "The fact that the
NERC findings were mentioned for the first time during the closing argument suffi-
ciently detracted from its [sic] significance as to taint the verdict." Id. at 1484.
B. The View in Other Jurisdictions
Unlike the Ninth Circuit, most jurisdictions treat the admissibility of
EEOC reasonable cause determinations as a matter committed to the
trial court's discretion, to be decided on a case-by-case basis. 7 In
Barfield v. Orange County,' for example, the Eleventh Circuit conclud-
ed that, given the variables involved in analyzing the admissibility of
EEOC determinations,' the decision should be left to the discretion of
the trial court.' The court acknowledged that such determinations may
be highly probative," but was "unwilling to say, as the Ninth. Circuit
seems to, that there can exist no EEOC determinations in which the...
circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness sufficient to justify exclu-
sion from evidence."'
In the Eleventh Circuit's view, it is appropriate to consider whether a
determination should be excluded for lack of trustworthiness under Rule
803(8)(C) of the Federal Rules of Evidence.93 The trial court also should
consider whether to exclude the determination under Rule 403' be-
87. See Crockett v. City of Billings, 761 P.2d 813, 820 (Mont. 1988). The Ninth Cir-
cuit has acknowledged that its view is out of step with the view prevailing in other
jurisdictions. See Gilchrist, 803 F.2d at 1500; Plummer v. Western Int'l Hotels Co., 656
F.2d 502, 504 n.5 (9th Cir. 1981). Only the Fifth Circuit has adopted an approach
approximating that of the Ninth Circuit. See Barfield v. Orange County, 911 F.2d 644,
649-50 (11th Cir. 1990) ("The Fifth Circuit approaches [the Ninth Circuit's] position,
largely foreclosing a challenge under Fed. R. Evid. 403 but reserving the possibility
that an EEOC determination could be excluded if 'the sources of information or oth-
er circumstances indicate a lack of trustworthiness,' the specific grounds provided in
Rule 803(8)(C).") (quoting McClure v. Mexia Indep. Sch. Dist., 750 F.2d 396, 400 (5th
Cir. 1985)). The Fifth Circuit, however, has recently retreated from the Ninth Circuit's
categorical view. See, e.g., Cortes v. Maxus Exploration Co., 977 F.2d 195, 201-02 (5th
Cir. 1992) (stating that McClure should not be read "as leaving district courts without
discretion under Rule 403 to exclude such [determinations] if their probative value is
substantially outweighed by prejudicial effect or other considerations enumerated in
the rule").
88. 911 F.2d 644 (11th Cir. 1990).
89. The court indicated that the factors to be considered include whether the de-
termination "contains legal conclusions in addition to its factual content," and wheth-
er it is of questionable trustworthiness. Id. at 650.
90. Id.
91. Id. On this point, the Barfield court was expressing agreement with the Ninth
Circuit See also Plummer, 656 F.2d at 505 (stating the view that such determinations
may be highly probative).
92. Barfield, 911 F.2d at 650 (internal quotation marks omitted).
93. Id. The rule creates an exception to the hearsay rule for public records or re-
ports, including "factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to au-
thority granted by law," unless the circumstances surrounding their preparation indi-
cate a lack of trustworthiness. FED. R. EvID. 803(8)(C).
94. The rule states, in relevant part, that evidence otherwise admissible may be ex-
cluded "if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
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cause its probative value is outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice.9"
Whether the case will be tried to the court or a jury should have no im-
pact on the first inquiry because the trustworthiness of the determination
is not affected by the identity of the trier of fact.' The difference, how-
ever, between jury trials and bench trials might well impact the inquiry
under Rule 403."7 As the Barfield court explained:
The admission of an EEOC report, in certain circumstances, may be much more
likely to present the danger of creating unfair prejudice in the minds of the jury
than in the mind of the trial judge, who is well aware of the limits and vagaries of
administrative determinations and better able to assign the appropriate weight and
no more.'
The view expressed in Barfield appears to be shared by the First, 9
Second,' °0 Third,'0 ' Fourth,' 2 Sixth,' 3 Seventh,0 4 Eighth,0 5 and
Tenth"° Circuits.' 7 In addition, it was recently embraced by the Fifth
prejudice." FED. R. EVID. 403.
95. Barfield, 911 F.2d at 650.
96. Id. at 650-51.
97. Id. at 651; see also Walker v. NationsBank of Fla. N.A., 53 F.3d 1548, 1554
(lth Cir. 1995) ("In particular, the distinction between a bench and a jury trial may
affect the district court's analysis of a determination letter's admissibility under Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence 403.").
98. Barfield, 911 F.2d at 651.
99. Smith v. Massachusetts Inst. of Tech., 877 F.2d 1106, 1113 (1st Cir. 1989).
100. Gillin v. Federal Paper Bd. Co., 479 F.2d 97, 99-100 (2d Cir. 1973).
101. Walton v. Eaton Corp., 563 F.2d 66, 75 (3d Cir. 1977).
102. Cox v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 471 F.2d 13, 15 (4th Cir. 1972).
103. Heard v. Mueller Co., 464 F.2d 190, 194 (6th Cir. 1972).
104. Tulloss v. Near N. Montessori Sch., Inc., 776 F.2d 150, 153-54 (7th Cir. 1985).
105. Johnson v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 734 F.2d 1304, 1309 (8th Cir. 1984). For a
general discussion of the Eighth Circuit's view, see Abbott, supra note 1, at 747-49.
106. Whatley v. Skaggs Cos., 707 F.2d 1129, 1136-37 (10th Cir. 1983); Nulf v. Inter-
national Paper Co., 656 F.2d 553, 563 (10th Cir. 1981).
107. The Ninth Circuit's rule of per se admissibility has also been rejected by a
number of state courts, including some within that circuit. See, e.g., Cantu v. City of
Seattle, 752 P.2d 390, 391-92 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988); Michail v. Fluor Mining & Metals,
Inc., 225 Cal. Rptr. 403, 404 & n. 1 (Ct. App. 1986). But cf. Mahan v. Farmers Union
Cent. Exch., Inc., 768 P.2d 850, 862 (Mont. 1989) (Sheehy, J., concurring and dissent-
ing) ("The better view, to be consistent with the Ninth Circuit, is to hold such re-
ports admissible, and for the trial court to instruct the jury to give such reports only
the weight they should be accorded."). Interestingly, several states have rejected both
federal approaches in favor of a rule of per se inadmissibility. Humphrey v. Nebras-
ka Pub. Power Dist., 503 N.W.2d 211, 219-20 (Neb. 1993); Crockett v. City of Billings,
761 P.2d 813, 820 (Mont. 1988); Tiemann v. Santarelli Enters., 486 A.2d 126, 131-32
(Me. 1984).
Circuit,'" which had previously been in essential agreement with the
Ninth Circuit. ') Thus, among circuits that have considered the issue,
the Ninth Circuit now stands alone in adhering to a rule of per se admis-
sibility."0
III. THE IMPACT OF REASONABLE CAUSE DETERMINATIONS ON SUMMARY
JUDGMENT PROCEEDINGS
A. The Ninth Circuit View
In the Ninth Circuit, the existence of an EEOC reasonable cause deter-
mination precludes summary judgment in favor of the employer."' The
first case to squarely address this issue was Gifford v. Atchison, Topeka
& Santa Fe Railway Co.," 2 where the court held that "an EEOC finding
of reasonable cause is 'sufficient at least to create an issue of fact' re-
quiring proceedings beyond the summary judgment stage.""' The plain-
tiff in Gifford filed a sex discrimination charge with the EEOC when her
employment was terminated."' After what the Ninth Circuit character-
ized as an "impartial investigation,""' 5 the EEOC found reasonable
108. See Cortes v. Maxus Exploration Co., 977 F.2d 195, 201-02 (5th Cir. 1992).
109. See Barfield v. Orange County, 911 F.2d 644, 649-50 (1lth Cir. 1990); Cantu,
752 P.2d at 392; Michail, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 404 n.1.
110. See Abbott, supra note 1, at 732 n.201, 743-45. District courts outside the Ninth
Circuit occasionally have been receptive to the Ninth Circuit approach. See Abrams v.
Lightolier, Inc., 702 F. Supp. 509, 512 (D.N.J. 1988); Strickland v. American Can Co.,
575 F. Supp. 1111, 1112 (N.D. Ga. 1983). However, most district courts would now be
precluded from adopting it by controlling precedent in their own circuits. See gener-
ally Thomas v. Heckler, 598 F. Supp. 492, 496 (M.D. Ala. 1984) (observing that "a
district court ... is bound to follow the law as announced by the . . . Circuit [in
which it sits]").
111. In Proctor v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 795 F.2d 1472 (9th Cir. 1986),
the court stated that an "EEOC finding of reasonable cause to believe that [a] female
plaintiff had been treated differently than similarly situated male employees was at
least sufficient to create [an] issue of fact as to [the] employer's motive in terminat-
ing [the] plaintiff, rendering resolution of [the] issue on summary judgment improper."
Id. at 1477 (citing Gifford v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 685 F.2d 1149, 1156
(9th Cir. 1982)). For a general discussion of Proctor, see Marcia Leitner, Summary,
Proctor v. Consolidated Freightways Corporation of Delaware: An Employer's Obli-
gation to Make a Good Faith Effort to Accommodate an Employee's Religious Be-
liefs, 17 GOLDEN GATE U. L REV. 109 (1987).
112. 685 F.2d 1149 (9th Cir. 1982). The issue was lurking in Bradshaw v. Zoological
Soc'y of San Diego, 569 F.2d 1066 (9th Cir. 1978), however, where the court reversed
a summary judgment ruling in favor of the employer and indicated that, on remand,
the trial court was to consider a reasonable cause determination it had stricken from
the plaintiffs complaint. Id. at 1068-69.
113. Mitchell v. Office of Los Angeles County, 805 F.2d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 1986)
(quoting Gifford, 685 F.2d at 1156).
114. Gifford, 685 F.2d at 1151.
115. Id. at 1156. The court's opinion actually contained no significant analysis of the
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cause to believe the plaintiff was treated differently than similarly situat-
ed male employees who were not discharged." 6 In the ensuing Title VII
litigation, the employer moved for summary judgment, arguing that the
plaintiff failed to state a claim."7 The plaintiff based her opposition to
the motion on the existence of the EEOC's reasonable cause determina-
tion."' The trial court granted the employer's motion,"9 concluding
that the plaintiff and the male employees treated more favorably were
not similarly situated.2 ' On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that the
EEOC's determination was sufficient to create an issue of fact on that
question. 2 ' Thus, the trial court erred in granting the employer's mo-
tion for summary judgment."n
The Ninth Circuit reaffirmed Gifford in Mitchell v. Office of Los Angel-
es County."23 The plaintiff in Mitchell brought a Title VII action alleging
that the defendant declined to hire him because of his race.'24 Prior to
instituting the action, he filed a charge of discrimination with the
EEOC. 25 The Commission found "reasonable cause to believe that the
Commission's investigation, even though the Commission took more than nine years
to issue a notice of right to sue. Id. The impartiality of EEOC investigations is not
always a given. See, e.g., EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 504 F. Supp. 241, 251 (N.D.
Ill. 1980) (observing that the "appearance of partiality on the part of the Commission
is palpable"), offd, 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988). In apparent recognition of that fact,
the Ninth Circuit has indicated that an employer is entitled to explore potential defi-
ciencies in an EEOC investigation. See Plummer v. Western Int'l Hotels Co., 656 F.2d
502, 505 n.9 (9th Cir. 1981) ("The defendant [employer], of course, is free to present
evidence refuting the findings of the EEOC determination on remand."). But cf. EEOC
v. Keco Indus., 748 F.2d 1097, 1100 (6th Cir. 1984) ("It was error for the district
court to inquire into the sufficiency of the Commission's investigation.").
116. Gifford, 685 F.2d at 1156. See generally Belissimo v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
764 F.2d 175, 179 (3d Cir. 1985) ("A plaintiff alleging a discriminatory firing need
show only that he was fired from a job for which he was qualified while others not
in the protected class were treated more favorably.") (citing Duffy v. Wheeling
Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 738 F.2d 1393, 1395 (3d Cir. 1984)).
117. Gifford, 685 F.2d at 1152.
118. Id. at 1156.
119. Id. at 1152.
120. Id. at 1156. See generally Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 583 (6th Cir.
1992) ("It is fundamental that to make a comparison of a discrimination plaintiffs
treatment to that of non-minority employees, the plaintiff must show that the
'comparables' are similarly-situated in all respects.").
121. Gifford, 685 F.2d at 1156.
122. Id.
123. 805 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1986).
124. Id. at 845.
125. Id.
[plaintiffs] allegation regarding the failure to hire is true.""6 Reasoning
that the EEOC is "expert in the investigation of [discrimination]
claims,"'27 the Ninth Circuit indicated that the EEOC determination was
sufficient to raise an issue of fact requiring proceedings beyond the sum-
mary judgment stage.'28
A district court in the Ninth Circuit has extended this analysis to the
findings of a state employment discrimination agency.'" In Stewart v.
Suwol,'3 ° the plaintiff claimed that the defendants discriminated against
him in violation of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973's' by
126. Id. at 847.
127. Id. The presumed expertise of EEOC investigators appears to be a significant
factor underlying the Ninth Circuit's deferential treatment of EEOC determinations. Cf.
Plummer v. Western Int'l Hotels Co., 656 F.2d 502, 505 (9th Cir. 1981) (stating that
"EEOC determinations are prepared by professional investigators on behalf of an
impartial agency"). See generally Smith v. Universal Servs., 454 F.2d 154, 157 (5th Cir.
1972):
[T]o ignore the manpower and resources expended on [an] EEOC investiga-
tion and the expertise acquired by its field investigators in the area of dis-
criminatory employment practices would be wasteful and unnecessary.
The fact that an investigator, trained and experienced in the area of discrimi-
natory practices and the various methods by which they can be secreted, has
found that it is likely that such an unlawful practice has occurred, is highly
probative of the ultimate issue involved in such cases. Its probative val-
ue . . .at least outweighs any possible prejudice to defendant.
Id.
However, other courts have been more circumspect. See, e.g., Johnson v. Yellow
Freight Sys., Inc., 734 F.2d 1304, 1309 (8th Cir. 1984) ("EEOC determinations are not
homogeneous products; they vary greatly in quality and factual detail."); see also
Abbott, supra note 1, at 738 ("Merely because the EEOC has the capability of con-
ducting quality investigations .. . does not mean its findings always reflect this ex-
pertise.").
128. Mitchell, 805 F.2d at 847 (citing Gifford v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry.,
685 F.2d 1149, 1156) (9th Cir. 1982). However, the court's discussion of the issue was
dictum, having occurred in the course of its analysis of the employer's claim for
attorneys' fees, rather than in considering a motion for summary judgment. See id. at
846-48.
129. Not all district courts in the Ninth Circuit agree, however, with its treatment of
reasonable cause determinations. In Williams v. City and County of San Francisco,
No. C-88-1829-JPV, 1993 WL 165307 (N.D. Cal. May 7, 1993), for example, the court
ignored Gifford and its progeny in granting the employer's motion for summary judg-
ment in a Title VII case, despite the existence of an EEOC reasonable cause deter-
mination. Id. at *4. In addition, the district court in Plummer declined to follow
Bradshaw's rule of per se admissibility. Plummer, 656 F.2d at 503 & n.3; see also
Gilchrist v. Jim Slemons Imports, Inc., 803 F.2d 1488, 1500 (9th Cir. 1986) (district
court reluctant to follow its view of Plummer).
130. 55 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 422 (D. Or. 1991).
131. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994). Section 504 prohibits federal agencies and recipients of
federal financial assistance from discriminating against individuals with disabilities. Id.
The Rehabilitation Act defines an "individual with a disability" to mean "any person
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refusing to hire him because he was regarded as having a mental impair-
ment."'32 The defendants moved for summary judgment,'" arguing that
the plaintiff was not hired because of unfavorable references from his
prior employers."u In response, the plaintiff relied upon a finding by
the Oregon Bureau of Labor and Industries"n that there was "substan-
tial evidence of [an] unlawful employment practice on the basis of handi-
cap. " Citing Gifford, the court stated "the finding of the Bureau of
Labor that there is substantial evidence that the defendants discriminated
against [the plaintiff] on the basis of handicap is sufficient to raise a
question of fact on this issue.""' The court therefore denied the
defendants' motion for summary judgment."
B. The View in Other Jurisdictions
The Ninth Circuit's view of the impact of reasonable cause determina-
tions on summary judgment proceedings is, like its view of the admissi-
bility of such determinations, at odds with the view prevailing else-
where." In Goldberg v. B. Green & Co.,'40 for example, the plaintiff
who (i) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more
of such person's major life activities, (ii) has a record of such an impairment, or (iii)
is regarded as having such an impairment." Id. § 706(8)(B) (1994).
132. Stewart, 55 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 423. The plaintiffs perceived dis-
ability allegedly arose out of treatment he received for stress. See id.; cf. Holihan v.
Lucky Stores, 87 F.3d 362, 365 n.3 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that stress "could be cov-
ered by the ADA"). For the author's consideration of various perceived disability
discrimination issues, see Michael D. Moberly, Perception or Reality?: Some Reflec-
tions on the Interpretation of Disability Discrimination Statutes, 13 HoFSTRA LAB.
U. 345 (1996).
133. Stewart, 55 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 422-23.
134. Id. at 426. Unfavorable references provide a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason
for a refusal to hire. See, e.g., Martinez v. National Broad. Co., 877 F. Supp. 219, 229
(D.N.J. 1994); Piascik v. Cleveland Museum of Art, 426 F. Supp. 779, 784-85 & nn.11-
12 (N.D. Ohio 1976). See generally Holder v. Old Ben Coal Co., 618 F.2d 1198, 1202
(7th Cir. 1980) ("A desire to hire . . . [a] better qualified applicant is a nondiscrimi-
natory, legitimate [basis for] a hiring decision.").
135. The Oregon Bureau of Labor and Industries is the agency responsible for en-
forcing Oregon's unlawful employment practice laws. See Pace Consultants v. Roberts,
687 P.2d 779, 780 (Or. 1984) (providing overview of agency's responsibilities)..
136. Stewart, 55 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 424, 426 (capitalization omitted).
137. Id. at 426.
138. Id.
139. This discrepancy undoubtedly is at least in part due to the Ninth Circuit's ap-
proach to the summary judgment issue as a corollary to its unique view that "a Title
VII plaintiff has an absolute right to introduce the . . . determination into evidence."
brought suit under the ADEA after being terminated at the age of fif-
ty. 4' The trial court granted the employer's motion for summary judg-
ment, concluding that the plaintiff had produced no direct or circumstan-
tial evidence of age discrimination."' On appeal, the plaintiff argued
that he had presented sufficient evidence for a jury to infer age discrimi-
nation and cited a determination by the Maryland Commission on Human
Relations"' finding probable cause to believe that the employer had dis-
criminated against him.' Although the Fourth Circuit assumed the
Commission's determination was admissible,'45 it rejected the plaintiffs
argument."6 The court stated:
[T]he Commission's findings are not sufficiently probative to create a genuine is-
sue of material fact about [the employer's] intent to discriminate on the basis of
age. The Commission's report merely repeats facts which [the plaintiff] himself
alleges elsewhere in this case, and then states in conclusory fashion that those
facts reflect age discrimination. Such facts, standing alone, are not enough to
salvage [the plaintiff's] claim.' 7
Gifford v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 685 F.2d 1149, 1156 n.4 (9th Cir. 1982)
(citing Plummer v. Western Int'l Hotels Co., 656 F.2d 502, 505 (9th Cir. 1981)); cf.
Stewart v. Personnel Pool of Am., Inc., No. Civ.A. 92-2581, 1993 WL 525575, at *5
(D.N.J. Dec. 16, 1993) (holding that an EEOC determination that "would not be ad-
missible at trial" cannot preclude summary judgment), affd, 30 F.3d 1488 (3d Cir.
1994).
140. 836 F.2d 845 (4th Cir. 1988).
141. Id. at 846-47. The ADEA prohibits discrimination against individuals who are at
least 40 years of age. 29 U.S.C. §§ 623(a), 631(a) (1994).
142. Goldberg, 836 F.2d at 847. The trial court also noted that the plaintiff had been
replaced by an older individual. Id. at 848. Replacement by another individual in the
ADEA's protected class is not fatal to an ADEA claim. See O'Connor v. Consolidated
Coin Caterers Corp., 116 S. Ct. 1307, 1310 (1996). Replacement by an older individual,
however, may be. See Haskell v. Kaman Corp., 743 F.2d 113, 122 (2d Cir. 1984) ("Al-
though proof of replacement by a person less than 40 years of age is not essential,
the successor should ordinarily be substantially younger than the discharged [employ-
ee] he replaces to warrant an inference of age discrimination from the circumstance
of age difference."). In the Ninth Circuit, however, "replacement by even an older
employee will not necessarily foreclose prima facie proof if other direct or circum-
stantial evidence supports an inference of discrimination." Douglas v. Anderson, 656
F.2d 528, 533 (9th Cir. 1981).
143. The Maryland Commission on Human Relations is the agency responsible for
enforcing Maryland's employment discrimination laws. See Maryland Comm'n on Hu-
man Relations v. Mass Transit Admin., 449 A.2d 385, 386 n.2 (Md. 1982).
144. Goldberg, 836 F.2d at 848.
145. Id. While the court acknowledged that the admission of such a determination
was within the trial court's discretion, it noted that in some cases a determination
may be "more prejudicial than probative." Id. at 8,18 n.4.
146. Id. at 848.
147. Id. (citing Johnson v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 734 F.2d 1304, 1309 (8th Cir.
1984)).
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District courts outside the Ninth Circuit have reached the same re-
sult."4 In Baumgardner v. Inco Alloys International,'49 for example,
the plaintiffs were retired employees of the defendant."5 Shortly after
the plaintiffs announced their retirements,'' their employer adopted a
new retirement plan and refused to permit them to rescind their retire-
ments in order to qualify for the new plan's enhanced benefits. 12 The
plaintiffs brought suit alleging that their exclusion from the new plan
violated the ADEA.' 5 The employer moved for summary judgment,"4
arguing that the plaintiffs failed to establish a prima facie case. The
plaintiffs responded by arguing that the EEOC's finding of probable
cause 5  was sufficient to preclude summary judgment.' The court
148. In addition, another federal appellate court has stated, in dicta, that "any
EEOC proceedings, while they may be relevant to summary judgment, are no substi-
tute for an independent judgment on the part of the district court." Ross v. Commu-
nications Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355, 363 (4th Cir. 1985). On the other hand, trial
courts outside the Ninth Circuit occasionally have been inclined to follow the Ninth
Circuit's approach. See, e.g., Walker v. NationsBank of Fla. N.A., 53 F.3d 1548, 1552-
53 (11th Cir. 1995) ("In denying the [employer's] summary judgment motion, the dis-
trict court assumed the admissibility of the EEOC determination letter and found that
the EEOC's determination was sufficient to establish a factual issue as to whether
the [employer's] legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for [the plaintiffs] termination
was pretextual.").
149. 746 F. Supp. 623 (S.D. W. Va. 1990).
150. Id. at 624.
151. See id.
152. See id. at 625.
153. Id. Under the ADEA, an employee benefit plan cannot require or permit invol-
untary retirements. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (1994); Trans World Airlines v. Thurston, 469
U.S. 111, 124 (1985).
154. Baumgardner, 746 F. Supp. at 624.
155. Id. at 625. The court described the requirements of a prima facie case under
the ADEA as follows:
To maintain an action, the [p]laintiffs must establish that they (a) are em-
ployees covered by the ADEA; (b) have suffered an unfavorable employment
action by an employer covered by the ADEA; (c) under circumstances in
which the employees' age was a determining factor in the action such that
"but for" their employer's motive to discriminate against them because of
their age they would not have suffered the action.
Id. (citing Lovelace v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 681 F.2d 230, 238 (4th Cir. 1982)). For
the author's consideration of the plaintiffs prima facie case and the parties' respec-
tive burdens of proof in ADEA cases, see Michael D. Moberly, Reconsidering the
Discriminatory Motive Requirement in ADEA Disparate Treatment Cases, 24 N.M. L
REV. 89 (1994).
156. The EEOC concluded that the employer's refusal to permit, the plaintiffs to
concluded that the EEOC determination merely restated the plaintiffs'
allegations." Relying on Goldberg, the court held that this was not suf-
ficient to create a genuine issue of fact precluding summary judgment in
favor of the employer."
The court in Kesselring v. United Technologies Corp. ° reached a
similar conclusion. 6' The plaintiff in Kesselring brought suit under the
ADEA claiming that his employment was terminated because of his
age. 62 The employer moved for summary judgment,"6 arguing that the
plaintiff was terminated as the result of a company-wide reduction in
force,"6 and that age was not a factor in his termination.'65 The
plaintiff argued that there was sufficient evidence to create an issue of
fact as to the employer's true motivation for discharging him." He re-
lied on a determination issued by the Ohio Civil Rights Commission'67
finding it "probable that [the employer] ... engaged in unlawful
practices.""'
postpone their retirements rendered the retirements involuntary. Baumgardner, 746 F.
Supp. at 625.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. 753 F. Supp. 1359 (S.D. Ohio 1991).
161. Id. at 1368-69.
162. Id. at 1361, 1363.
163. Id. at 1361.
164. The plaintiffs supervisor had been instructed to reduce the number of employ-
ees in the plaintiffs department because the employer was losing money due to a
decrease in demand for its product. Id. at 1364. Such a cost-based reduction in force
ordinarily constitutes a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for termination. See, e.g.,
Pearlstein v. Staten Island Univ. Hosp., 886 F. Supp. 260, 269 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) ("A
reduction-in-force is a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason to terminate an employee,
provided that the decision regarding who to terminate is not tainted by unlawful dis-
crimination.") (citations omitted).
165. Kesselring, 753 F. Supp. at 1363.
166. Id. at 1365.
167. The Ohio Civil Rights Commission is the agency responsible for administering
and enforcing Ohio's civil rights laws and eliminating unlawful discrimination. See
Brewer v. Republic Steel Corp., 513 F.2d 1222, 1223 (6th Cir. 1975); Ohio ex rel. Civil
Rights Comm'n v. Gunn, 352 N.E.2d 654, 654 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975), affd, 344 N.E.2d
327 (Ohio 1976). The Commission is charged with duties similar to those of the
EEOC. See Harden v. Dayton Human Rehabilitation Ctr., 520 F. Supp. 769, 774 (S.D.
Ohio 1981), affd, 779 F.2d 50 (6th Cir. 1985). For example, like the EEOC, the Ohio
Civil Rights Commission "receives and investigates charges of unlawful discriminatory
practices, and . . . must attempt to eliminate violations by means of conference, con-
ciliation, and persuasion." Brewer, 513 F.2d at 1223.
168. Kesselring, 753 F. Supp. at 1368. Citing Heard v. MueUer Co., 464 F.2d 190,
194 (6th Cir. 1972), which left the admission of EEOC determinations to the trial
court's discretion, the Ohio district court had previously held that "[flindings of the
Ohio Civil Rights Commission shall be admitted on the same basis . . . and shall be
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Relying upon Goldberg and Baumgardner, the court held that the
Commission's conclusory findings'" were not sufficient to save the
plaintiffs claim from summary judgment.70 In reaching this result, the
court relied in particular upon the fact that the Commission issued its
determination without considering evidence substantiating the employer's
articulated reason for the plaintiffs discharge. 7 ' The court stated that
"where the administrative agency's findings merely repeat the plaintiffs
allegations and make conclusory determinations of... discrimination,
the agency's probable cause determination is not sufficient to preclude
summary judgment."'72
In Bailey v. South Carolina Department of Social Services,73 a dis-
trict court in South Carolina also relied on Goldberg to hold that a rea-
sonable cause determination did not preclude summary judgment in
favor of the employer. 74 The plaintiff in Bailey brought suit under Title
VII alleging that he had been denied a promotion because of his race and
gender. 75 In response to the employer's motion for summary judgment,
the plaintiff argued that an EEOC determination, which found reasonable
cause to believe he had not been promoted because of his race, was
sufficient to create an issue of fact precluding summary judgment.' 76
However, the court held that because the reasonable cause determination
was internally inconsistent,7 7 it lacked any probative value."7h Because
the determination was the only evidence the plaintiff had presented in
entitled to such weight as is deemed appropriate." Harden, 520 F. Supp. at 773-74.
169. The court noted that the Commission's report "summarily state[d] that 'Evi-
dence substantiates that [the employer] retained similarly situated employees who
were considered younger and less senior than charging party.'" Kesselring, 753 F.
Supp. at 1369 (quoting the Commission's report).
170. Id.
171. Id. The employer apparently elected not to provide this evidence to the Com-
mission during the course of its investigation. See id.
172. Id. (citing Goldberg v. B. Green & Co., 836 F.2d 845 (4th Cir. 1988) and
Baumgardner v. Inco Alloys Int'l, 746 F. Supp. 623 (S.D. W. Va. 1990).
173. 851 F. Supp. 219 (D.S.C. 1993).
174. Id. at 221.
175. Id. at 220.
176. Id. at 221.
177. The determination stated both that none of the employees promoted in lieu of
the plaintiff were less qualified than the plaintiff, and that the plaintiff was "clearly
better qualified" .than those same employees. Id.
178. Id.
response to the employer's motion, the employer was entitled to summa-
ry judgment.'79
Goldberg was also followed in Cary v. Carmichael."S The plaintiff in
Cary was terminated after refusing to consent to a drug testing policy
agreed to by the employer and the plaintiffs union. '81 The plaintiff
brought suit under Title VII alleging that his termination was unlawful
because the employer failed to accommodate his religious beliefs."
The employer moved for summary judgment.'" The plaintiff responded
by citing an EEOC determination"u that found reasonable cause to be-
lieve the plaintiff was "denied a religious accommodation and thereby
unlawfully discharged.""
Citing Goldberg, the court stated that an EEOC reasonable cause deter-
mination "may not be sufficiently probative to create a genuine issue of
material fact" precluding summary judgment in favor of the employer.'
Significantly, the court relied upon the same distinction between Title VII
reasonable cause determinations and ADEA letters of violation the Ninth
Circuit recognized in Gilchrist v. Jim Slemons Imports, Inc. '87 to sup-
port that conclusion."s Because a reasonable cause determination
merely reflects a tentative conclusion that there has been a statutory
violation, it may be of minimal value in evaluating an employer's motion
for summary judgment.' In addition, because the determination at is-
179. Id.
180. 908 F. Supp. 1334 (E.D. Va. 1995).
181. Id. at 1338. Although the plaintiff was not a member of the union, he was a
member of the bargaining unit it represented, and thus was covered by the terms of
the collective bargaining agreement establishing the drug testing policy. Id. at 1337.
See generaUy Saunders v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 927 F.2d 1154, 1156 (10th Cir. 1991)
("Union membership . . . is irrelevant to the applicability of a collective bargaining
agreement Rather, an individual employed in a craft governed by a collective bar-
gaining agreement is bound by the terms of that agreement, regardless of his union
membership.") (citations omitted).
182. Cary, 908 F. Supp. at 1339-40, 1342. The plaintiff informed the employer that
his refusal to consent to testing was based upon "his status as an ordained Baptist
minister." Id. at 1338.
183. Id. at 1339.
184. See id. at 1341-42.
185. Id. at 1339. Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to fail to "reasonably
accommodate to an employee's or prospective employee's religious observance or
practice." 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000ej), 2000e-2(a) (1994).
186. Cary, 908 F. Supp. at 1341.
187. 803 F.2d 1488, 1500 (9th Cir. 1986).
188. Cary, 908 F. Supp. at 1341-42.
189. Id. at 1342; cf. Abbott, supra note 1, at 738 (stating that the characterization
of a reasonable cause determination as "highly probative" is overstated because such
a determination "is merely a preliminary finding that there is reason to believe there
has been a violation of [the statute], rather than a conclusive finding of a violation");
id. at 744 ("ITIhe fact that an EEOC determination is not a conclusive finding on
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sue in Cary stated the Commission's finding in a conclusory fashion"9
and did not appear to have been based upon an independent investi-
gation, 9' the court gave it little weight. 2 Thus, after an independent
analysis of the case,"n the court granted the employer's motion for
summary judgment. '
IV. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
The Ninth Circuit has never fully explored the ramifications of its
treatment of reasonable cause determinations.95 For example, the court
has indicated that the potential prejudice to the employer resulting from
its rule of per se admissibility is minimized by the employer's ability to
introduce evidence disproving the EEOC's findings and to point out defi-
ciencies in the EEOC determination."' Other courts, however, have
concluded that employers are unable to confront EEOC determinations
in the same way they can cross-examine adverse witnesses. 7 In addi-
whether a [statutory] violation has occurred should weigh against its probative val-
ue.").
190. Cary, 908 F. Supp. at 1341; cf. Estes v. Dick Smith Ford, Inc., 856 F.2d 1097,
1105 (8th Cir. 1988) (noting that EEOC determination "consisted only of two
conclusory sentences"); Johnson v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 734 F.2d 1304, 1309 (8th
Cir. 1984) (stating that "the EEOC determination of reasonable cause ... is support-
ed factually by only two highly conclusory sentences").
191. See Cary, 908 F. Supp. at 1341. The court noted in particular that the factual
recitation in the determination was "wholly based upon the ... facts alleged by the
plaintiff." Id.
192. Id. at 1342. See generaUy Tulloss v. Near N. Montessori Sch., Inc., 776 F.2d
150, 153 (7th Cir. 1985) (stating that "the trial judge has the discretion to give as.
much or as little weight to [EEOC determinations] as he deems appropriate").
193. See Cary, 908 F. Supp. at 1340-53. See generaUy Ross v. Communications Satel-
lite Corp., 759 F.2d 355, 363 (4th Cir. 1985) (stating that "EEOC proceedings ... are
no substitute for an independent judgment on the part of the district court").1 194. Cary, 908 F. Supp. at 1353. Among other things, the court concluded that be-
cause the plaintiff had "only state[d] his status as a Baptist minister as his reason
for ... objecting" to the drug testing policy, and had been "unwilling[] to elaborate
on [his] belief to the employer," the employer had "no information to rely on to
attempt to accommodate the employee." Id. at 1344. See generally Byrd v. Johnson,
31 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1651, 1668 (D.D.C. 1983) ("In order to establish a
prima facie case of religious discrimination, a plaintiff must... demonstrate that
he . . . communicated his [religious] belief to his . .. employer.").
195. See Abbott, supra note 1, at 744-45 (indicating that the Ninth Circuit has not
weighed the competing costs and benefits of admitting reasonable cause determina-
tions in evidence).
196. Plummer v. Western Int'l Hotels Co., 656 F.2d 502, 505 n.9 (9th Cir. 1981).
197. See, e.g., Johnson v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 734 F.2d 1304, 1309 (8th Cir.
tion, time spent exposing the weaknesses of an EEOC determination may
unduly prolong the trial' and detract from the main purpose of the liti-
gation, which is to determine whether the employer actually engaged in
discriminatory conduct."'
Foremost among the reasons for the Ninth Circuit's reception of rea-
sonable cause determinations2" is its desire to make use of the profes-
sional expertise, and presumed impartiality, of EEOC investigators."'
The court has stated that to exclude such "highly probative" evidence of'
discrimination "prepared by professional investigators on behalf of an i-
partial agency [would be] wasteful."20 2
The Ninth Circuit's view of the EEOC's impartiality is overstated.2 '
The view originated in the Fifth Circuit's decision in Smith v. Universal:
Services, Inc.,2" where the court concluded that reasonable cause de-
terminations should be admissible because they are "not prepared in an-
ticipation of litigation," and because the EEOC has no interest in the
1984); see also Abbott, supra note 1, at 744 ("[Dleficiencies in EEOC investigations
may not be obvious from the face of a determination, or the investigators may not
be available as witnesses. Thus, absent exclusion of the evidence, the potential for
prejudice might go unchecked.").
198. Johnson, 734 F.2d at 1309; EEOC v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 373 F.
Supp. 1321, 1338 (D. Del. 1974), affd, 516 F.2d 1297 (3d Cir. 1975); see also Abbott,
supra note 1, at 744 (stating that the Ninth Circuit has "ignored the issue of whether
presentation of deficiencies in an EEOC investigation might unduly lengthen the tri-
al).
199. See, e.g., Walker v. NationsBank of Fla N.A., 53 F.3d 1548, 1555 (11th Cir.
1995); EEOC v. Keco Indus., 748 F.2d 1097, 1100 (6th Cir. 1984); EEOC v. Chicago
Miniature Lamp Works, 526 F. Supp. 974, 975 (N.D. I1. 1981); E.L DuPont de
Nemours & Co., 373 F. Supp. at 1338. See generally Harden v. Dayton Human Reha-
bilitation Ctr., 520 F. Supp. 769, 773 (S.D. Ohio 1981) ("[Tlhe Court fails to compre-
-hend how a conclusion reached by an administrative agency can render ... the
existence or non-existence of discrimination ... either more or less probable. Rather,
an assessment of these issues will depend upon the facts of a particular case, not
upon an agency's conclusions regarding those facts."), affd, 779 F.2d 50 (6th Cir.
1985).
200. See generally Abbott, supra note 1, at 74345 (discussing Ninth Circuit's posi-
tion).
201. See supra notes 61 and 127 and accompanying text.
202. Plummer v. Western Int'l Hotels Co., 656 F.2d 502, 505 (9th Cir. 1981).
203. See, e.g., Abbott, supra note 1, at 737 ("Despite the EEOC's apparent interest
in Title VII litigation, courts tend to refer to the agency as impartial."); White, supra
note 13, at 1264 n.112 (stating that the EEOC's investigation of some charges "may
not be neutral").
204. 454 F.2d 154 (5th Cir. 1972). The Ninth Circuit relied upon Smith in both
Bradshaw v. Zoological Soc'y of San Diego, 569 F.2d 1066 (9th Cir. 1978) and Plum-
mer, where Smith was described as "the first case to address this issue." Plummer,
656 F.2d at 504; see also Smith, 454 F.2d at 156 ("This is a case of first impression.
Neither party has been able to cite any district or appellate case directly in point.").
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litigation in which they may be offered."' This observation, however,
was made prior to passage of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of
1972,2" which amended Title VII to authorize the EEOC to bring dis-
crimination Suits against employers, 7 and thus cast doubt on the valid-
ity of the analysis in Smith.2" In fact, many EEOC investigators now
view themselves as advocates for the charging party,2" and their bias in
that regard is occasionally evident.210
205. Smith, 454 F.2d at 158.
206.. Pub. L No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972).
207. See White, supra note 13, at 1257 n.65. As originally enacted, Title VII limited
the EEOC's function to investigating charges and attempting conciliation. Occidental
Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 358 (1977). If its conciliation efforts failed, the
EEOC's involvement in the matter ended. Id. at 358-59. Enforcement could then be
achieved only by the aggrieved party initiating private litigation against the employer.
Id. at 359. The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 altered this scenario by
authorizing the EEOC to bring suit on behalf of individuals aggrieved by unlawful
practices. Id.; see also Henry v. City of Detroit Manpower Dep't, 739 F.2d 1109, 1112
(6th Cir. 1984), vacated on other grounds, 763 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1985); EEOC v.
Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 735 F.2d 69, 72 n.2 (3d Cir. 1984).
208. See White, supra note 13, at 1257 n.65 (stating the Smith court's observation
that the EEOC can have no interest in litigation in which its reasonable cause deter-
minations may be offered is "not always true today"); id. at 1264 n.112 (noting that
some Commission investigations "are conducted in anticipation of litigation").
209. See, e.g., EEOC v. Michael Constr. Co., 706 F.2d 244, 251 (8th Cir. 1983) (not-
ing that the "EEOC specialist investigating [the] charge pursued the investigation at
least 'partially' with the intent of achieving a monetary settlement even though . . .
she saw no merit to [the] charge"); EEOC v. Jacksonville Shipyards, 696 F. Supp.
1438, 1440 (M.D. Fla. 1988) (describing the EEOC as the "representative of the charg-
ing parties"). See generally General Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 326 (1980) (stat-
ing that "the EEOC acts . . . at the behest of and for the benefit of specific individu-
als" as well as for the public); Marshall v. Sun Oil Co., 605 F.2d 1331, 1335 (5th Cir.
1979) (stating that the Secretary of Labor-the EEOC's predecessor in enforcing the
ADEA-was "more than a mere proxy for each victim of ... discrimination");
Abbott, supra note 1, at 736 ("Arguably, . . . [a reasonable cause] determination will
reflect the agency's interest in pursuing the employer's compliance with Title VII.").
210. See, e.g., EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 504 F. Supp. 241, 251 (N.D. Ill. 1980)
(stating EEOC investigator's bias against employer was "palpable"), affd, 839 F.2d 302
(7th Cir. 1988); EEOC v. Raymond Metal Prods., 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 206,
207 (D. Md. 1978) (noting EEOC questionnaire was "so suggestive as to the response
sought" that the information obtained was of questionable reliability); cf. Bell v. St.
Regis Paper Co., 425 F. Supp. 1126, 1134 (N.D. Ohio 1976) (declining to ascribe defi-
ciencies in an EEOC investigation to an "intentional" effort by the EEOC investigator
to weigh her determination in the plaintiffs favor). According to Abbott:
Bias may . . . stem from partisan political or policy goals that an investigat-
ing agency seeks to implement The EEOC has been entrusted with no less a
task than guiding the fundamental change of "the patterns of employment
The Ninth Circuit's view of the probative value of reasonable cause
determinations" ' is also exaggerated. 22 The EEOC's investigation of a
charge of employment discrimination is neither binding nor adjudicative
in nature.2 '3 Its purpose is merely to determine whether there is any ba-
sis for the charge.2"4 Thus, the Commission is not required or even ex-
pected to conduct a full-scale adversarial investigation under the perti-
nent employment discrimination laws."5 The nature and extent of the
investigation are instead committed to the EEOC's discretion.216 As a
result, EEOC investigations vary greatly in scope and quality.2 7
In Barfield v. Orange County,25 for example, the EEOC considered
only the information the parties themselves chose to submit prior to
issuing its determination.2 9 Because employers are not generally re-.
discrimination that [have] become ossified in the labor market." EEOC inves-
tigators, charged with the responsibility of ferreting out employment discrimi-
nation in all its various forms, may be biased or pressured into finding viola-
tions.
Abbott, supra note 1, at 736 (footnotes omitted) (quoting J. LeVonne Chambers &
Barry Goldstein, Title VII at Twenty: The Continuing ChaUenge, 1 LAB. LAw. 235, 242
(1985)).
211. See supra notes 23, 60-61, 85 and accompanying text (discussing probative val-
ue of EEOC determinations).
212. See Smith v. Universal Servs., Inc., 454 F.2d 154, 160 (5th Cir. 1972) (Dyer, J.,
dissenting) (referring to the "very questionable probative value ... [of] EEOC re-
ports"); Abbott, supra note 1, at 738 (stating that the characterization of a reasonable
cause determination as "highly probative" is overstated because such a determination
"is merely a preliminary finding that there is reason to believe there has been a vio-
lation of Title VII, rather than a conclusive finding of a violation").
213. Tulloss v. Near N. Montessori Sch., Inc., 776 F.2d 150, 152 (7th Cir. 1985); cf.
White, supra note 13, at 1250 ("The EEOC investigative process is not adversarial.").
214. EEOC v. Keco Indus., 748 F.2d 1097, 1100 (6th Cir. 1984). Consistent with that
analysis, the reasonable cause determination that may result from an EEOC investiga-
tion is intended to notify the employer of the EEOC's view of the charge, and to
provide a basis for later conciliation proceedings. Id. The determination "is not an
adjudication of rights and liabilities." Jacksonville Shipyards, 696 F. Supp. at 1441.
215. EEOC v. American Mach. & Foundry, Inc., 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
1634, 1640 (M.D. Pa. 1976). Indeed, the court in Bell v. St. Regis Paper Co., 425 F.
Supp. 1126 (N.D. Ohio 1976), held that incomplete EEOC investigations are not partic-
ularly objectionable precisely because they are merely "directed toward a determina-
tion of whether or not there exists reasonable cause to believe that the charging
party has suffered discrimination." Id. at 1134.
216. Keco Indus., 748 F.2d at 1100; EEOC v. Chicago Miniature Lamp Works, 526 F.
Supp. 974, 975 (N.D. 11. 1981) (stating that the EEOC's determination of reasonable
cause is discretionary).
217. Johnson v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 734 F.2d 1304, 1309 (8th Cir. 1984); see
also Walker v. NationsBank of Fla. N.A., 53 F.3d 1548, 1555 (lth Cir. 1995) (refer-
ring to "the vagaries of [EEOC] determinations").
218. 911 F.2d 644 (lth Cir. 1990).
219. Id. at 651; cf. EEOC v. Michael Constr. Co., 706 F.2d 244, 252 (8th Cir. 1983)
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quired to respond to EEOC charges,20 such an investigation could often
result in a determination based entirely on the plaintiffs contentions,
without considering the employer's position." A determination issued
under those circumstances would be a particularly unreliable indication
that discrimination has occurred,2 2 and probably should be excluded
from evidence under both Rule 403 and Rule 803(8)(C) of the Federal
Rules of Evidence.'s The fact that at least some EEOC determinations
are unlikely to satisfy the standards for admission under these eviden-
tiary rules (or even the theoretical possibility that such determinations
(finding that the employer responded to EEOC investigation by providing "only [the]
information it chose"). This investigatory approach has been criticized. See Abbott,
supra note 1, at 727 n.162.
220. See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.15(a) (1995) (stating that "the Commission will accept any
statement of position [the employer] wishes to submit"). However, the Commission
can require the employer to participate in a fact-finding conference, and can issue
subpoenas requiring the attendance of witnesses and the production of documents. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-9; 29 C.F.R. §§ 1601.15(c), 1601.16-.17; EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S.
54, 63 (1984); Michael Constr. Co., 706 F.2d at 248.
221. See, e.g., Cary v. Carmichael, 908 F. Supp. 1334, 1341 (E.D. Va. 1995) (stating
that the reasonable cause determination was "wholly based upon the ... facts al-
leged by plaintiff"); Harris v. Birningham Bd. of Educ., 537 F. Supp. 716, 721 (N.D.
Ala 1982) (discussing EEOC issuance of reasonable cause determinations without
considering evidence favorable to the employer), affd in part and rev'd in part, 712
F.2d 1377 (11th Cir. 1983); cf. Cortes v. Maxus Exploration Co., 758 F. Supp. 1182,
1183-84 (S.D. Tex. 1991) (finding that the probable cause determination was properly
excluded because the EEOC issued a "no probable cause" determination "without
interviewing [the] complainant"), affd, 977 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1992); Hicks v. ABT
Assocs., Inc., 572 F.2d 960, 966 (3d Cir. 1978) ("Plaintiff . . . was never contacted by
the EEOC investigator and indeed did not know that the investigation was proceeding
until the final determination of no reasonable cause had been mailed to him.").
222. See Michael Constr. Co., 706 F.2d at 252 (stating that employer's decision to
provide "only what information it chose and to respond to specific factual allegations
in the narrowest possible manner ... would seriously hamper the EEOC in making
an independent determination on [probable] cause"); Angelo v. Bacharach Instrument
Co., 555 F.2d 1164, 1176 (3d Cir. 1977) (referring to the "minimal probative value ...
[of] an ex parte EEOC evaluation of the ultimate factual issue in the case").
223. Angelo, 555 F.2d at 1176 (stating that, under Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, the trial court could have concluded that the danger of unfair prejudice
outweighed the probative value of the EEOC evaluation); see also Abbott, supra note
1, at 739-40 ("Determinations rendered after only. an ex parte investigation by the
EEOC have been excluded from jury consideration, for fear a jury may be unfairly
influenced by a determination based on a one-sided assessment of the facts.").
could exist)'s demonstrates the impropriety of the Ninth Circuit's cate-
gorical rule of per se admissibility.2
5
And even if such determinations are admissible, they should not,
standing alone, be sufficient to permit plaintiffs to avoid summary judg-
ment, even in the Ninth Circuit. 6 When reviewing summary judgment
rulings in employment discrimination cases, the Ninth Circuit (like other
circuits) 227 applies the United States Supreme Court's analysis in Ander-
son v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.' Under Liberty Lobby, "'there is no issue
for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party
for a jury to return a verdict for that party. If the evidence is merely
colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be
granted.'"' This standard suggests that a reasonable cause determina-
tion, standing alone, should be insufficient to preclude summary judg-
ment in favor of the employer in many, if not most, employment discrim-
ination cases.'
224. See Barfield v. Orange County, 911 F.2d 644, 650 (11th Cir. 1990) (rejecting the
Ninth Circuit's apparent conclusion that "there can exist no EEOC determinations in
which the ... circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness sufficient to justify
exclusion from evidence") (internal quotation marks omitted).
225. See Abbott, supra note 1, at 709-12 (detailing three reasons why the per se ad-
missibility approach adopted by the Fifth and Ninth Circuits should be rejected); see
also White, supra note 13, at 1259 ("Mandatory admission of EEOC files in all cases
is inconsistent with Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8)(C), which provides that public
records are not admissible evidence when 'the sources of information or other cir-
cumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness.'") (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 803(8)(C)). In-
deed, the frequency with which courts exercising discretion elect to exclude EEOC
reasonable cause determinations on the grounds of unfair prejudice or
untrustworthiness is itself a strong argument against the Ninth Circuit's position. See
Abbott, supra note 1, at 755-56 (concluding that a balancing test under Rule 403
should replace the per se admissibility rule).
226. In Williams v. City and County of San Francisco, No. C-88-1829-JPV, 1993 WL
165307 (N.D. Cal. May 7, 1993), a district court in the Ninth Circuit granted the
employer's motion for summary judgment on a discriminatory failure to hire claim
under Title VII, despite the existence of an EEOC reasonable cause determination. Id.
at *4. The court indicated that the EEOC's failure to inquire into the qualifications of
the individual selected for the promotion "significantly weaken[ed] the probative force
of the EEOC finding." Id.
227. See, e.g., Marx v. Schnuck Markets, Inc., 76 F.3d 324, 328 (10th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 116 S. Ct. 2552 (1996); Beard v. Whitley County REMC, 840 F.2d 405, 409-10
(7th Cir. 1988).
228. 477 U.S. 242 (1986); see Robinson v. Adams, 847 F.2d 1315, 1316 (9th Cir.
1987).
229. Robinson, 847 F.2d at 1316 (quoting Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 249-50 (cita-
tions omitted)).
230. See Kesselring v. United Techs. Corp., 753 F. Supp. 1359, 1369 (S.D. Ohio 1991)
(applying Liberty Lobby to grant employer's motion for summary judgment on the
ground that state agency's probable cause determination was "merely colorable" and
.not significantly probative").
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For example, a reasonable cause determination issued without consid-
ering the employer's explanation for its conduct" would merely assist
in establishing the plaintiffs prima facie case. 2 Establishing a prima
facie case, however, is not necessarily sufficient to permit the plaintiff to
avoid summary judgment.' In many cases, evidence of a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory basis for the employer's actions is sufficient to rebut
the inference of discrimination raised by the prima facie case.' In that
event, the plaintiff can offer additional evidence to show that the
employer's explanation for its conduct was pretextual, but cannot avoid
summary judgment merely by "rest[ing] on the laurels of her prima facie
case."
5
231. See supra notes 218-21 and accompanying text.
232. The EEOC's own explanation of its reasonable cause standard confirms this.
Under the three-step burden shifting procedure established by McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) and Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981), the plaintiff has the burden of establishing a prima
facie case of discrimination and, if the employer articulates a legitimate, nondiscrimi-
natory reason for its actions, of demonstrating that the employer's articulated reason
is pretextual. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252-53. How-
ever, in evaluating a charge of discrimination to determine whether reasonable cause
exists, the Commission inquires into whether there is evidence of pretext only if the
employer has offered a defense to the charge. EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) § 40.2 at
1062 (1988). If the employer offers no explanation for its conduct, the
Commission's investigation is limited to ascertaining whether the "evidence . . . estab-
lishes, under the appropriate legal theory, a prima facie case." Id.; see also SCHLEi &
GRosSMAN, supra note 13, at 374 (stating that "whether ... there has been discrimi-
nation . . . [is] to be assessed by determining first whether a prima facie case exists,
and then by analyzing any evidence of pretext if the respondent has put forward a
Mable defense'"). Establishing a prima facie case is, in fact, the reason for which
most EEOC reasonable cause determinations are offered in evidence. See, e.g.,
Sumner v. San Diego Urban League, Inc., 681 F.2d 1140, 1143 (9th Cir. 1982); see
also Abbott, supra note 1, at 724 (observing that "[e]mployees use a determination of
reasonable cause to support the prima facie case of discrimination"); id. at 730 (stat-
ing that "the purpose in introducing a determination is to lend evidentiary support
to . . . the employee's prima facie case").
233. Grigsby v. Reynolds Metals Co., 821 F.2d 590, 595 (11th Cir. 1987); Haglof v.
Northwest Rehabilitation, Inc., 910 F.2d 492, 495-97 (8th Cir. 1990) (Stuart, J., concur-
ring). See generally Blue v. United States Dep't of the Army, 914 F.2d 525, 535 (4th
Cir. 1990) ("The cases in which summary judgment has been granted a Title VII de-
fendant, even after [the] plaintiff was able to establish a prima facie case of discrimi-
nation, are -numerous.").
234. Grigsby, 821 F.2d at 596.
235. Id.
This analysis applies in the Ninth Circuit,2" as well as in other juris-
dictions." Thus, even under the Ninth Circuit's rule of per se admissi-
bility, a discrimination claim unsupported by other admissible evidence
should not be saved from summary judgment by the mere existence of a
reasonable cause determination,' particularly where the determination
was issued without considering the employer's position."9
V. CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit holds that EEOC reasonable cause determinations
are so probative of discrimination that they are always admissible in
employment discrimination litigation.24 ° The better view, however, gives
trial courts discretion to exclude such determinations when the circum-
stances surrounding their preparation suggest untrustworthiness, or
when their potential for prejudicing a jury outweighs their probative
value.2 " The latter approach permits courts to deal with the vagaries of
EEOC investigations,242 and therefore is more consistent with the statu-
236. See, e.g., Steckl v. Motorola, Inc., 703 F.2d 392, 393-94 (9th Cir. 1983).
237. See Haglof, 910 F.2d at 495-96 (Stuart, J., concurring) (noting that "[t]he First
and Eleventh Circuits have held in ADEA cases that establishment of a prima facie
case does not in itself entfile a plaintiff to survive a motion for summary judgment,"
and that "[tihe Eighth Circuit has affirmed a summary judgment for a defendant
where the plaintiff in an employment discrimination case established a prima facie
case").
238. See, e.g., Bailey v. South Carolina Dep't of Soc. Servs., 851 F. Supp. 219, 221
(D.S.C. 1993); cf. Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. Young, 446 F. Supp. 979, 1002 n.67
(E.D. Mich. 1978) (giving EEOC determination "no weight" because it was "contrary
to the [other] evidence in the record"), rev'd on other grounds, 608 F.2d 671 (6th
Cir. 1979). See generally Tulloss v. Near N. Montessori Sch., Inc., 776 F.2d 150, 153
(7th Cir. 1985) ("Even in [a] circuit[] in which EEOC determinations are per se ad-
missible, the trial judge has the discretion to give'as much or as little weight to
them as he deems appropriate.").
239. Cf. Kesselring v. United Techs. Corp., 753 F. Supp. 1359, 1369 (S.D. Ohio 1991)
(granting employer's motion for summary judgment where state agency's probable
cause determination was issued "without the benefit of the documentation and testi-
mony presented by [the employer]"); Williams v. City and County of San Francisco,
No. C-88-1829-JPV 1993 WL 165307, at *4 (N.D. Cal. May 7, 1993) (granting employer's
motion for summary judgment where EEOC failed to inquire into qualifications of
individual selected for promotion).
240. See supra notes 43-86 and accompanying text.
241. See supra notes 87-110 and accompanying text.
242. See supra notes 211-25 and accompanying text.
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tory employment discrimination scheme' and applicable evidentiary
rules.2'
The Ninth Circuit's view that the existence of a reasonable cause de-
termination precludes summary judgment in favor of the employer
should also be reconsidered.24  If a reasonable cause determination can
be excluded from evidence, its mere existence should not preclude sum-
mary judgment. 246 And even where a reasonable cause determination is
found to be admissible, it should not preclude summary judgment if it is
contrary to the other evidence presented to the trial court.247
243. Among other things, the legislative history of Title VII suggests that courts
should not inquire into the propriety of reasonable cause determinations because "the
issue of reasonable cause does not present a separate litigable issue." 110 CONG. REC.
15,895 (1964) (statement of Rep. Celler).
244. See Abbott, supra note 1, at 732-41, 751-53.
245. See supra notes 226-39 and accompanying text.
246. See Kesselring v. United Techs. Corp., 753 F. Supp. 1359, 1369 (S.D. Ohio
1991); Stewart v. Personnel Pool of Am., Inc., No. Civ.A. 92-2581, 1993 WL 525575, at
*6 (D.N.J. Dec. 16, 1993), affd, 30 F.3d 1488 (3d Cir. 1994).
247. Bailey v. South Carolina Dep't of Soc. Servs., 851 F. Supp. 219, 221 (D.S.C.
1993); Kesselring, 753 F. Supp. at 1369; cf. Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. Young, 446
F. Supp. 979, 1002 n.67 (E.D. Mich. 1978) (reasoning that EEOC determination, when
contrary to other evidence at trial, was entitled to no weight), rev'd on other
grounds, 608 F.2d 671 (6th Cir. 1979).

